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A recent report by Ahearn and Newton (2009) provides a timely summary of the obstacles that 
beginning and low-resource farmers continue to face as they attempt to enter U.S. agriculture. 
They find that, “beginning farmers and ranchers face two primary obstacles: high startup costs 
and a lack of available land for purchase or rent. Beginning farmers are less likely than 
established farmers to rent farmland. They are just as likely as established farmers to own all of 
the land they operate - although they own smaller acreage and are more likely to carry debt on 
their land. The most common way beginning farmers acquire land is to purchase it from a 
nonrelative, rather than inherit it or receive it as a gift” (pp. iii-iv). While the USDA has developed 
programs to assist beginning and low-resource farmers, some states have also enacted 
legislation that provides financial assistance to these farmers for the purpose of acquiring 
production assets. 
 The Rural Finance Authority (RFA) was established by Minnesota state law in 1986 to 
administer a program where state bonds are issued and their proceeds used to develop 
Minnesota’s agricultural resources (Rural Finance Authority). Initially, the RFA was designed to 
help lenders and borrowers restructure loans that had become unsecured. However, since 1987, 
the RFA funds have been extended to assist beginning and low-resource farmers to acquire real 
estate. As farm land values have continued to increase, these higher prices have made it difficult 
for many beginning farmers to finance real estate purchases using significant proportions of debt 
financing, based on the net cash flow generated just by the land.  Thus, farmers and lenders 
identified debt financing of land purchases as a potential “barrier to entry” for new farmers and an 
obstacle to the transfer of land from one generation of farmers to the next.  
Two RFA loan programs have focused on the credit needs of beginning and low-resource 
farmers, the Basic Farmer Loan Program and the Seller-Assisted Loan Program. Under the Seller 
Assisted program the seller of a farm property funds a portion of the financing necessary for the 
sale. Due to the similarities of these two programs the RFA refers to the joint programs as the 
Basic/Seller-Assisted Loan (BSAL) Program. Through its involvement in rural credit markets, the 
RFA aims to improve access to credit among credit-constrained farmers.  Since its inception, the 
BSAL has assisted 1,573 Minnesota farmers and provided about $87 million in loan funds.   
The objective of this study is to investigate what effect this credit market intervention has on 
the performance and investment behavior of participating farmers, some of whom are credit 
constrained. No previous attempt has been made to rigorously evaluate the farm-level effects of 
the BSAL program. 
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Loan Program Characteristics 
The RFA acquires a stake up to 45% of the total loan amount needed to finance the real estate 
investment at an interest rate below that of the primary lender, reducing the cost of borrowing and 
helping farmers to “cash flow” their operations. Through 2008, the maximum BSAL financing has 
been set at $200,000 with the cumulative effect that the borrower can borrow up to $440,000 
when combining loans from both the RFA and a private lending institution. More than one loan 
could be acquired from the RFA as long as the total amount borrowed does not exceed $200,000 
and the applicant stays within the selection criteria.   
The BSAL program targets farmers who aim to become full time farmers. The application 
selection criteria used by the program excludes speculators and investors looking for tax 
advantages. These selection criteria are in place to avoid an over extension of credit or an 
extension of credit to entities that do not meet the State credit assistance eligibility guidelines. 
 The BSAL interest rate is determined by Minnesota’s 10-year bond rate at the time the 
loan is issued. RFA program costs are funded through an interest rate deferential between the 
State bond rate and the farmer loan rate. With a low $50 application fee and farm lenders 
screening their clients for eligibility, nearly all BSAL applicants tend to qualify. The amortization 
period is flexible with 15, 20, 25, 30 and 35-year amortization periods. The RFA loan matures in 
10 years after which the borrower is required to pay the remainder of the RFA loan (a 10-year 
balloon payment is required). The Minnesota bond is then repaid with the proceeds of the loan. 
The BSAL program is the RFA’s highest priority portfolio, and the RFA has in the past 
moved funds appropriated for other programs to the BSAL program. A limited number of loans 
have defaulted during 1995-2003 and in most cases the RFA recovered the full loan amount 
through the sale of the property. The RFA has established also a reserve fund to help it meet its 
responsibilities in times of high default rates. 
According to RFA rules of eligibility a participant must:  
•  have a minimum down payment of 10%; 
•  be an individual who is a resident of Minnesota, a domestic family farm corporation, or a 
family farm partnership; 
•  have sufficient education, training or experience to succeed in the type of farming that they 
intend to practice; 
•  have a total net worth of less than $398,000 (2008 limit) indexed for inflation including the 
assets and liabilities of their spouse and dependents; 
•  have the financial need for a loan and the ability to repay the loan; 
•  agree to be the principal operator of the farm to be purchased and intend to make farming 
their principal future occupation; 5 
 
•  agree to consult with a local adult farm management instructor and enroll in a farm 
business management program approved by the Minnesota Commissioner of Agriculture 
for at least the first three years of the loan, if an approved program is available within 45 
miles from the borrower's residence; 
•  agree to consult with a local Board of Water and Soil Resources office or the county 
Natural Resources Conservation Service; and 
•  agree to carry credit life insurance for the amount of the loan. 
By reducing the exposure of the private lender to 55%, the RFA lowers the risk to the lender 
and makes it easier for the lender to approve the loan.  A lender’s decision to join the RFA 
program is voluntary and all lenders who are active in Minnesota are eligible to take part in the 
program. Lenders determine their own terms and conditions for their part of the BSAL contract 
and the RFA negotiates terms and conditions with each lender separately. The lender’s part of the 
loan is financed with a higher interest rate and can have an interest rate of more that 4% above 
the RFA rate. Also, the lender has the option to increase the down payment percentage. 
 
Credit constraints and rationing 
Much of the previous economic literature on credit rationing has focused on the problem of 
identifying the factors that restrict access to formal sources of credit. Some research has 
discussed the negative effect of credit rationing on income and consumption levels (Zeller et al., 
2001) and others have evaluated the impacts on a farmer’s ability to optimize profits and 
investments (Foltz, 2002). Most of these studies have been implemented using data from 
developing countries.  
 In the case of an investment Petrick (2005) identifies credit as “a means to enable 
investment by solving a liquidity problem” (p. 192). Thus, a credit constraint (presumably due to 
credit rationing by a lender) becomes a reason for observed underinvestment.  We can also think 
of a potential borrower as being externally credit rationed if the borrower’s demand for credit 
exceeds the available supply of credit at the market rate of interest. Thus, while a credit constraint 
is a capital resource limitation that a farmer faces and external credit rationing is the result of a 
lending decision, the impact on a farmer without adequate liquidity is the same - they both serve 
as impediments to capital formation.   
Foltz (2002) suggests that credit constraints can have potentially two effects.  A credit 
constraint (or reduced access to credit) restricts liquidity leading a farmer to use inputs only up to 
the level of available capital.  The resulting suboptimal allocation of production inputs reduces 
profitability and produces a “profit-liquidity effect.”  Alternatively, a credit constraint can also limit 
the level of investment in capital assets and land.  Forgoing these long term investments leads to 
an eventual decline in farm profitability and an “investment demand effect” is observed.  Foltz 6 
 
finds evidence for the liquidity effect of credit access on farm profitability among Tunisian farmers, 
due to a suboptimal allocation of inputs. There is no observed effect of credit rationing on 
investment demand among these farmers, although there is a difference between the investment 
behavior of credit rationed and nonrationed farmers.   
Lenders ultimately decide which clients will receive credit and how much they will receive. 
In each case the lending decision is based on the application of a set of rules or underwriting 
guidelines. These rules may take into consideration information about variables such as farm 
capital and/or farmer characteristics.  Although some of these variables are unobserved, this 
approach helps us structure an empirical analysis of the credit rationing problem in the case of 
Minnesota’s BSAL farmer participants. Farmers who participate in the BSAL program are selected 
using criteria that suggest they may have been credit rationed and/or they face credit constraints 
that prohibit capital investments.  An implication is that, if BSAL participants receive sufficient 
credit to alleviate their credit constraint problem, an improvement will be made in their liquidity 
status sufficient to undertake the investment and they will be able to achieve higher levels of 
productivity and profitability. 
 
Credit Rationing Model 
 
The underlying hypothesis of interest in this study is suggested by Foltz.  If a farmer is initially 
credit rationed, the opportunity to borrow will produce a switch between the rationed and the 
nonrationed credit regimes. If we measure the differences in the parameters of the estimated 
equations that predict the performance of the two types of farmers (rationed and nonrationed), we 
can assess the implied costs of credit rationing. The measures of performance might include farm 
profits (or revenues) or the level of farm investments undertaken. For example, with regard to 
farm productivity and profitability, we expect that credit rationed farmers will generate relatively 
larger increases in both if the credit constraint is alleviated.   
Further, Foltz suggests that there are potentially two switching models. In the exogenous 
switching model we assume that any unobserved factors (e.g., farmer ability, farm assets) that 
influence profitability are also independent of the unobserved credit rationing effect. The 
alternative is an endogenous switching model where the unobserved characteristics of farm 
assets and farmer ability influence both the likelihood of being credit rationed and the increase in 
profitability that occurs once the credit constraint is alleviated. In this latter case, the problem is 
that endogeneity confounds the observed output effects with the effects of improving credit 
access. If one does not control for this form of endogeneity, the effects of removing the credit 
constraint will be overstated.      7 
 
Using this approach Foltz defines a model where L
d( ) represents the farmer’s loan 
demand function and L
s( ) represents the farmer’s available loan supply function. Further, L
f ( ) is 
the formal loan supply function (loans from formal credit institutions) and L
i ( ) is the informal loan 




d (Rf, K, θ, ud)      loan demand function   (1) 
L
s (Rf, K, θ, us) = L
f (Rf, K, θ, us) + L
i (Rf, K, θ, us) loan supply function   (2) 
 
where Rf represents the formal credit market interest rate, K represents farm capital, and θ 
represents various observed farm/farmer quality characteristics. The ud and us terms capture all 
latent (unobserved) qualities for the demand and supply functions, respectively. Since loan 
demand equals loan supply under credit market clearing conditions, we can write G* as the 
equilibrium excess demand for credit (where G is equal to loan demand minus loan supply).  
 
G* = L
d (Rf,K,θ,ud) - L
s (Rf,K,θ,us)        (3) 
  
Credit rationing occurs when credit supply is less than credit demand. Since G* is not directly 
observed we need a proxy for credit rationing.  So, we define a binary variable G and set G=1 
when G* > 0 (the farmer is credit rationed), but set G=0 when G* = 0 (the farmer is not credit 
rationed).  
A linear equation can be written as G* = γ’ Z + ε, where Z represents a vector containing 
observations of farmer qualities which might be influencing credit availability and γ is a vector of 
underlying parameters.  Then the probability of being credit rationed can be written as 
 
Prob (G* >0) = Prob (γ’ Z + ε >0).        (4)  
 
Here the random disturbance term (ε) is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance one. It represents the effects captured by the latent unobserved qualities (u) for demand 
and supply, respectively, and the random noise in the data. In (4) the probability that G*>0 (being 
credit-rationed) is modeled using a standard probit model. The probit estimation of credit rationing 
has a cumulative normal S-shaped distribution (Ф) when evaluated using the independent 




Ln G* = Σ Gi =1 Ln Фi + Σ Gi =0 Ln (1-Фi).        (5) 
 
The coefficients in the estimated probit equation measure the effects of the Z vector variables on 
the cumulative normal distribution and, thus, the effects of the underlying dependent variables on 
the probability that G=1 (the farmer is credit rationed). 
 
Switching Regression Models 
 
Following Foltz, let us denote the profit equations for the nonrationed and rationed groups as y
n 
and y
c, respectively.  Then the expected farm profit equations can be written   
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 c Li
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 n Li
s + E(ui
yn | Gi = 0) not credit rationed.  (7) 
 
In (6) and (7), G is the credit rationing indicator variable, Xi is a vector of farm/farmer qualities, 
and Pi and Li
 represent the price and credit supply vectors, respectively. The term  u is a random 
variable that describes latent qualities of the farm and farmer that are not observed by the 
econometrician (Foltz). The effect of credit rationing is measured by comparing the estimated 
coefficients of the credit rationed group and the nonrationed group. The expectation is that the 





c.  In this second-stage regression equation y 
represents the dependent variable as measured by profits, revenues, or investments.  
 
Exogenous switching model 
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n are the random disturbance terms which are assumed to be uncorrelated with 
each other and with the error term. From this assumption Foltz shows that one can derive the 
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s are as defined earlier, and the error terms (n
c,n
n) are assumed to be uncorrelated.  
In this second stage regression the estimated b and  coefficients are the marginal effects 
and they can be compared across the two credit regimes. The coefficient comparison establishes 
the effect of credit rationing where bi
n - bi
c equals the effect of credit rationing associated with the 
i
th variable and 
n - 
c equals the liquidity effect on profitability due to credit rationing, where it is 
expected that  
n=0 for nonrationed farmers and 
c >0 for credit rationed farmers. 
 
Endogenous switching model 
From an econometric perspective, endogeneity occurs when the latent unobserved effects are 
included in the random disturbance term (n). These unaccounted-for effects cause n
c and n
n to be 
correlated with e (the error term in the credit rationing probit estimation). This will result in 
inconsistent estimates of the independent variable coefficients. In order to account for these latent 
effects the assumption of exogenous independent variables is relaxed. As recommended by 
Maddala (1983) and shown in Foltz, the structure of the econometric model is analogous to the 
exogenous switching model but when compared to the exogenous model in (9) and (10) it 
includes an additional term to the correct for endogeneity. 
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Thus, to account for endogeneity, the inverse Mill’s ratio l(a) is derived from the credit rationing 
probit equation. In (12) we expect ei  to be £ 0 leading to an equation similar to the credit rationed 
model. The inverse Mills ratio l(a) is included in both of the second stage OLS models (11) and 
(12) and the resulting models are expected to produce asymptotically normal estimates for the b
c 
and b
n vectors.  
Due to the interrelationships of the underlying farm resource and farmer characteristics, 
endogeneity may be present in the regression analysis. Therefore, the switching regression 
model is expected to have inconsistent estimated coefficients. In a small sample application such 
as this (with less than 250 observations) a correction for heteroscedasticity is recommended 10 
 
(Long and Erven, 1998).  We use the HC3 method recommended by Long and Erven to correct 




In order to implement the econometric analysis, farmer mail survey data is used (Nel, 2006). The 
farmer survey was conducted among 838 farmers who participated in the BSAL during 1987-
2004. Surveys that were returned with a signed disclosure agreement permitted access to 
additional borrower financial data in the RFA applicant files. One hundred and eighteen farmers 
released their RFA file data for this study and 82 farmers completed the survey. This represents a 
response rate of 9.7% (n=82) for completed surveys and 14% (n=118) for access to RFA file 
information. Although the whole population of BSAL recipients was surveyed, and the sample is 
not random, the survey respondents are found to be representative of all BSAL recipients 
according to their farm type (crop, dairy, hogs, and cattle) and location in Minnesota. To compile a 
consistent financial data set, farmers were asked for information from their IRS Form 1040 and 
the associated Schedule-F tax form. We included survey questions that identify farm capital 
assets, farmer characteristics, and credit rationing status at the time of the loan application. 
 
Credit rationing proxy variable 
This study modifies the methodology suggested by Foltz to be applicable to Minnesota farmers 
and the BSAL program. We define credit rationing similar to Foltz.  Credit rationing occurs when a 
borrower does not receive the required operating and capital investment loans and has a 
willingness to pay a higher interest rate to obtain the required financing. Unlike the analysis 
developed by Foltz, where some Tunisian farmers may not have a demand for credit, the 
Minnesota farmers who participated in the BSAL all have an expressed demand for credit. Thus, 
we concentrate on three possible scenarios at the time an eligible farmer makes the BSAL loan 
application: 1) the farmer has insufficient operating and investment credit to enter farming, 2) the 
farmer has sufficient operating capital but lacks sufficient investment credit to expand, 3) the 
farmer has sufficient capital for the expansion investment, but is seeking better loan terms. 
Therefore, to classify farmers entering the BSAL program into “credit constrained” and “not 
credit constrained,” a survey was conducted in which farmer participants were asked: “Could you 
have financed your real estate purchase in the year prior to your application, if the RFA program 
was not available?”  The answer to this question signals the farmer’s perception of having 
sufficient credit available to make the real estate investment without the BSAL at the time of 
application. Thus, the farmer’s answer is used as a proxy for credit rationing, because it describes 11 
 
the farmer’s ability to finance the real estate investment through commercial credit institutions 
without State assistance. Answering “no” indicates that the farmer could not acquire the 
necessary investment credit and, therefore, is credit rationed. In this case the credit rationed 
farmer is given a proxy variable RFN = 1, otherwise the nonrationed farmer is given RFN = 0.  
This approach captures all three applicant scenarios and includes farmers who are eligible for 
the RFA program, but may have adequate capital for the planned investment. About 50% of the 
surveyed farmers indicated that they required the BSAL to acquire the real estate assets at the 
time they applied. This type of self-reporting of credit status is subjective and has the potential for 
upward measurement bias, as farmers may respond in a way that justifies their application 
decision.  We do not attempt to measure the degree of this measurement bias.   
There are various reasons why farmers may feel that they would not have been able to 
obtain the desired financing without the BSAL. Some possible reasons include; the farmer was 
discouraged by previous attempts to acquire debt financing from other lender sources, the local 
banker may have told the farmer that they would not be able to acquire the necessary financing 
without the BSAL loan, or the farmer may have determined that the investment was not feasible 
without the lower interest rate offered by the BSAL.  
 
(insert Table 1 here) 
 
Credit rationing model variables 
As suggested by Foltz, the independent variables that might be used to predict credit rationing 
can be divided into two classes – farm fixed capital (K) and farm/farmer qualities (θ). These two 
classes of variables are regularly used by loan officers to make credit decisions and we assume 
that they have an influence on the farmer’s probability of being credit rationed. The variables used 
in the empirical analysis are reported in Table 1 by credit status. The farm capital variables 
include: owned farmland, owned farm machinery, and net worth. Farm/farmer quality variables 
include: family living expenses, farmer post-high school education, farming arrangement with 
family members, length of loan amortization, proportion of off-farm income, and having a loan 
from a lender.   
  The unconditional means of the sample data are reported in Table 1. Farmers who are not 
credit constrained have lower total farm liabilities and higher net worth levels and less invested in 
machinery and equipment. Farmers who are credit rationed report generally higher average farm 
sales and profit levels, although these may not represent significant differences between the two 
groups of farmers. Unexpectedly, farmers who indicate that they are credit constrained also report 
more owned farm land and higher family living expenses. Foltz finds similar patterns among 12 
 
Tunisian farmers, but he finds that credit constrained farmers have smaller farms and lower living 
expenditure levels on average.   These comparisons are for the unconditional means and none of 
the differences we observe between the variable means are statistically significant given the large 
standard deviations in the sample data. In the estimation and analysis that follows we control for 
several important variables as we investigate the multivariate relationship between credit rationing 
and several of these variables. Thus, we will develop a better understanding of which factors 
explain credit rationing and the effects that credit rationing exerts on farm performance and farmer 
investment behavior.      
Using the probability framework, historical farm level data in the BSAL applicant file and 
the farmer survey allows us to determine the likelihood of being credit-rationed at the time of the 
loan application. The signs of the coefficients in the estimated probit equation indicate increases 
in demand or supply, respectively. For example, a coefficient with a negative sign indicates that 
an increase in the variable will likely increase credit supply more than credit demand and reduce 
the likelihood of being credit rationed.  Conversely, a positive coefficient indicates that demand is 
likely to be increased relative to supply, and credit-rationing is more likely to occur.   
 
(insert Table 2 here) 
 
Probit Model Results 
 
Initially, we apply a reduced version of the model reported by Foltz to the Minnesota BSAL data 
set (see Table 2). Since we exclude the family size, loan default, and titled land variables (which 
Foltz included in his model), this specification is not intended as a test of Foltz’s model.  Rather, it 
is used to establish the fact that there is good consistency between the estimation results that we 
generate for several variables that are in common with those analyzed by Foltz. We estimate also 
an extended BSAL model with additional variables from the same Minnesota BSAL data set to 
provide a set of comparative results. We find that the two models produce quite consistent results 
(e.g., coefficient signs and magnitudes) for the common set of variables.  The BSAL model 
provides a reasonably good fit to the data and predicts correctly the credit status for 62% of the 
farmers in the sample.  
In the BASL model we add variables such as farming arrangement, farmer net worth, off-
farm income, and loan amortization period.  Factors that tend to increase significantly the 
likelihood of being credit rationed include: owned farm land, owned farm machinery, post-high 
school education, and the loan amortization period. Increasing the farm acreage owned 
significantly increases the likelihood of a farmer being credit rationed.  A large initial investment in 13 
 
real estate in the years prior to applying to the BSAL appears to decrease the farmer’s ability to 
obtain financing for additional farm expansion projects. Similarly, farm machinery owned has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of being credit rationed. Post-high school education is significant 
and the estimated model produces a positive sign, so that credit demand is increased more than 
supply by increasing the level of post-high school education. While unexpected this sign may be 
an indication that more highly educated farmers rely more on programs like the BSAL to enter 
farming. The amortization period of the BSAL loan has a positive effect on being credit rationed.  
Farmers who are credit-rationed may need an extended amortization period to be able to make 
the additional loan payments required by the expansion of real estate debt.  
Two factors significantly reduce the likelihood of being credit rationed.  They include the 
farmer’s net worth position and the existence of a farming arrangement at the time the BSAL 
application is made. It is logical that farmer net worth would be used by the participating lender to 
make the credit decision, since it represents available collateral that a farmer may use to secure 
additional credit.  The family farming arrangement variable in effect decreases the capital 
requirements needed to farm and as expected it tends to reduce the likelihood of being credit 
rationed. 
 
Switching Models  
 
In the switching regressions for farm profits and farm investments, we identify the liquidity effects 
of credit rationing and evaluate the implicit costs of credit rationing that are associated with 
measurable farm and farmer characteristics. The cost of credit rationing is expected to be the 
difference between the estimated coefficients of the independent variables across the two credit 
regimes.  For the purpose of estimating the switching regression models we identify some 
additional variables that represent the capital resources of the farms and the farm/farmer qualities 
that influence profitability and investment decisions of participants in the BSAL.  
 Total farm debt (liabilities) is a key variable in this switching regression framework, since it 
instruments the liquidity effect of credit rationing. Total farm debt is defined as the sum of current 
and long-term liabilities, as reported on the farmer balance sheet.  Logically, a ceteris paribus 
increase in total farm debt implies a decrease in farm financial liquidity. Thus, we expect that a 
significant positive coefficient on the total farm debt variable in the credit rationed farmer profit 
equation indicates there is a liquidity effect on farm profits. We expect that, conditional on being 
credit rationed, farmers who gain access to BSAL loans will improve their liquidity and ability to 
invest. It is expected that these investments will generate significant increases in farm productivity 
due to a more optimal allocation of inputs and the ability to achieve increased economies of size.  14 
 
Analogously, the total farm debt variable is used also to identify a liquidity effect in the farm 
investment equation where a significant positive coefficient on the total farm debt variable in the 
credit rationed farmer investment equation indicates there is a liquidity effect on farm investment 
behavior.  
 
(insert Table 3 here) 
   
Farm sales equation 
In Table 3 we report the results from both the exogenous and endogenous models for the 
ordinary least squares regression with the average level of farm sales (during the three years 
prior to loan application) as the dependent variable.  The sales variable is used as an indicator of 
the overall level of farm productivity.  We also investigated several other measures of farm 
productivity (gross farm income) and profitability (net farm income and net cash farm income).  
Farm sales and gross farm income are the most comparable measures of farm productivity, yet 
farm sales is a better measure of the impact of credit on farm operations, since gross farm income 
also includes income from several nonfarm and nonoperating sources of income which are not 
related to farming operations. The farm profitability measures have relatively large variances 
(probably due to a high level of variability in farm expenses) and the excessive noise in those two 
measures make them less useful for evaluating the impact of credit. The farm sales variable is 
highly correlated with gross farm income (correlation coefficient = 0.95) and slightly less 
correlated with each of the farm profitability measures (the correlation coefficient with net cash 
farm income = 0.65 and with net farm income = 0.36). Thus, we expect that the regression results 
for farm sales will reflect the impact of the BSAL loan program on overall farm profitability as well.             
 Both the endogenous and exogenous regression models have F-statistic values that 
indicate the estimated models are significant at the 1% level. However, the Mills ratio variable is 
not significant in the endogenous separation model, suggesting that there is no significant 
endogeneity effect in the survey data and the exogenous separation model is an adequate 
representation of the role that credit rationing plays in determining farm productivity differences. 
Although all regressions are significant, it is interesting to note that the equations for farmers who 
are not credit rationed tend to be slightly better predictors of the effects of credit rationing status 
on farm sales than the equations for the credit rationed farmers.  
 As expected, there is a measurable liquidity effect present among farmers who face a 
credit constraint. The positive coefficient on the total debt variable in the credit rationed farmer 
equation indicates that a liquidity effect exists as the funds provided by the BSAL program would 
significantly increase sales. A comparison of the estimated coefficients in the two exogenous 15 
 
model equations implies that for each $1 increase in credit received the credit rationed farmers 
increase their sales by about $0.27 more than the nonrationed group of farmers. The average 
amount of credit extended to the credit rationed farmers in our sample was $149,557. This implies 
that the average increase in farm sales would be about $40,380 due to improved liquidity. This 
finding confirms the presence of a liquidity effect of credit access on farm productivity among 
credit rationed farmers in the sample. We find similar evidence of a liquidity effect when the farm 
sales variable is replaced with a measure of farm profitability as the dependent variable.  
  In Table 3 we see that there is no relationship between household living expenses and 
farm sales among the credit rationed group of farmers, but these expenses significantly increase 
with the level of sales and productivity of farmers who are not credit rationed. This contrasts with 
the opposite findings of Foltz in Tunisia where household expenditures increase with the 
profitability of credit constrained farmers, but no such effect is present among farmers who are not 
credit constrained. Foltz suggests that the level of living expenses is a proxy for the permanent 
income level of the household and that such a positive effect on farm profits is expected.  
Logically, higher consumption expenditures imply lower savings at any given level of expected 
income and, therefore, a positive relationship might be expected between profits and living 
expenses. But that relationship should hold regardless of credit status.  We find evidence of such 
a positive and significant relationship among the Minnesota farmers who are not credit 
constrained, but it is not significant among those who report facing an external credit constraint.   
 When we look at the effect of off-farm income on farm sales we see a strong negative 
impact of off-farm income on the level of farm sales among the farmers who are not credit 
rationed. Among the credit rationed group of farmers we see a similar (but insignificant) effect on 
farm sales. Clearly, there is a trade-off between farm and nonfarm work for both groups of 
farmers, yet the farmers who are credit rationed face a lower opportunity cost when pursuing off-
farm income.   
 Two other variables are of interest even though they are not significant predictors of 
overall farm productivity.  We find that owned farm land is not a significant variable in the farm 
sales equation. In contrast Foltz finds that owned farm land has a positive effect on farm profits 
for both the credit rationed and not credit rationed farmer groups, and the effect is greater for the 
credit rationed farmers. Our results imply that there is no significant divergence of the shadow 
prices of farm land among farmers in our sample. One interpretation is that farm real estate 
markets in Minnesota operate more like competitive markets, so there should not be any 
differences in the shadow prices of farm land among these farmers. Finally, higher education 
levels do not tend to increase farm sales among either the credit rationed group or the not credit 
rationed group. Foltz finds a similar pattern for the education variable when predicting profitability 16 
 
among Tunisian farmers. These results imply that the “cost of education” among credit rationed 
farmers is not significantly different from that of farmers who do not face a credit constraint. The 
lack of significance in our analysis may be due to the fact that the sample data do not reveal large 
differences between the education levels of these two groups.  
 
(insert Table 4 here) 
   
Farm investment equation 
Average annual depreciation expense during the three years following the BSAL loan application 
is used as the dependent variable in the farm investment equation. Depreciation expense is a 
reasonable proxy for changes in the level of investments subsequent to receiving the BSAL loan, 
as farmers have an incentive to use depreciation as a tax shield as it has the effect of reducing 
pre-tax earnings and tax liability.  Thus, as farmers use improved access to credit to acquire more 
assets, they also increase their average annual levels of depreciation expense.  
 In Table 4 we summarize the exogenous and endogenous OLS regression models for 
farm investments. The Mills ratio variable is again not significant in the endogenous separation 
model, which suggests that there is no endogenous effect in the survey data and the exogenous 
separation model is an adequate representation of the role that credit rationing plays in 
determining differences in farm investment behavior.   
The estimated investment demand equations show that the expected liquidity effect is 
present among the credit rationed group of farmers. The significant positive coefficient on the total 
farm liabilities variable in the exogenous model for the rationed farmers indicates that they 
increased investments in depreciable assets as a result of obtaining the BSAL loan, while farmers 
who are not credit rationed do not exhibit an investment demand response. Thus, the BSAL loan 
appears to mitigate the liquidity constraint that credit rationed farmers face. 
Farmers who identify themselves as being credit rationed and who had attained higher 
levels of education appear to have a positive demand for increasing their investment levels. In 
comparison farmers who are not credit rationed but also achieved higher education levels do not 
exhibit a positive investment response as a result of participating in the BSAL program. One 
interpretation is that this latter group of farmers participates in the program primarily to obtain 
more favorable credit terms. The effect of education on investment demand in this study contrasts 
with that reported by Foltz, where education actually had a negative impact on investment 
demand conditional on receiving access to credit. Our results appear to be more consistent with 
the expected relationship. 17 
 
The presence of a formal farming arrangement between the beginning farmer and family 
members has a negative effect on the demand for farm investments. This result is consistent with 
the general view that these farming arrangements provide access to machinery and equipment 
that would otherwise have required purchase with credit (making the credit constraint more 
severe).  Thus, among credit rationed farmers the use of farming arrangements relaxes the credit 
constraint so that investments might be made in other capital assets such as farm land.   
Similarly, we find that the level of off-farm income has the effect of reducing the demand 
for farm investments conditional on being credit rationed. Farmers who are not credit rationed do 
not change their investment behavior as off-farm income varies while credit rationed farmers 
significantly reduce their investments in farm capital assets when off-farm activities increase the 
level of household income. We suggest that off-farm income tends to have the effect of reducing 
the severity of the credit constraint. However, an underlying labor allocation choice may also be 
influencing the investment behavior of the credit rationed group of farmers.  It is plausible that 
investments in farm capital assets might be used to substitute for farm operator labor time, thus 
increasing the demand for farm capital assets.  Yet, with more time spent off the farm to earn 
income, these farmers may be revealing a preference to grow more slowly, and that depresses 
the demand for farm production assets. In addition off-farm employment may provide for 
additional benefits such as health insurance coverage which may be motivating these farmers to 
continue their off-farm income activities, even though the credit constraint is made less severe by 
participation in the BSAL loan program.            
The estimated negative coefficient on the owned farm land variable is not highly 
significant, yet it raises an interesting point about the effect of owned capital assets in the 
investment demands of these beginning and low-resource farmers. It suggests that a credit 
rationed farmer who initially owns more farm land would choose to invest less in depreciable 
production assets. A similar farmer who is not credit rationed would have no such investment 
response. This difference across the two credit regimes is present in both the exogenous and 
endogenous models. It is a result that merits further research with a more complete panel data 




Our primary objective has been to use data from participants in the Minnesota Basic and Seller 
Assisted Loan program (BSAL) during 1995-2003 to estimate the beneficial effects that credit 
rationed farmers realize compared to those who are not credit rationed. Only farmers who 
received BSAL loans are analyzed. Thus, we do not compare these farmers with other beginning 18 
 
or low-resource farmers who did not apply for BSAL loans or with farmers whose loan 
applications were rejected by the Rural Finance Authority. For this reason the results of our study 
are not strictly comparable with those of other studies where the data set includes farmers who do 
not receive loans. 
 We find that there are liquidity effects of credit rationing present for a significant share of 
the beginning and low-resource farmers who participated in the program. This finding serves as 
an economic argument for the BSAL program.  The program improves access to farm real estate 
credit and, thus, promotes a more optimal allocation of farm inputs and increases in farm 
investments for those farmers who are credit constrained. The analysis produces empirical 
evidence that credit rationing has a liquidity effect for farm productivity and profitability and for 
investments in farm capital assets. The general findings of this study are quite consistent with 
earlier research on the effects of credit constraints on farmers in developing countries.  
 There are also differences between the findings of this study and those of prior studies, 
differences that may be attributable to structural and competitive differences that may exist 
between factor markets for land, labor and capital in developing and developed countries. Two 
such examples are the role of off-farm income and owned farm land in determining the effect of 
program participation on the severity of the credit constraint. We find evidence that there is a 
trade-off between farm and off-farm work for both credit constrained farmers and those who are 
not credit constrained.  Yet, farmers who are credit constrained appear to face a lower opportunity 
cost when pursuing off-farm income activities. They also may be attracted to off-farm employment 
due to the availability of health insurance benefits which are increasingly important to self-
employed farmers. These and other off-farm employment benefits may also alleviate the liquidity 
constraint that they face. We also find that owned farmland is not a significant factor in 
determining the effect of credit access on farm productivity and profitability.  Specifically, there is 
no observed divergence of the shadow prices of land among the two farmer groups in our sample 
of beginning and low-resource farmers.  This implies that when farm real estate markets operate 
more competitively, programs that are designed to improve access to farm real estate credit in 
developed countries may have a less distorting effect on land prices than what might be found in 
developing countries where imperfections in the land market are more severe.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables by Farmer Credit Status 
 
 All Farmers Not Credit Rationed  Credit Rationed 
 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 




Owned farm land (acres) 114 67  140 57  51 88 57 83 176 
 
Owned farm machinery ($) 116 63,842  56,479 58  57,357 50,339 58 70,326 61,774 
 
Farming arrangement  
(0,1) 113 0.60  0.51 54  0.69 0.51 59 0.53 0.50 
 
Living expenses ($) 115 24,794  11,957 58  23,352 11,364 57 26,262 12,460 
 
Net worth ($) 117 145,242  77,219 58  150,295 78,568 59 140,274 76,214 
 
Total farm liabilities ($)  116 158,806  154,104 57  137,945 113,215 59 178,960 184,040 
 
Post-high school education 
(years) 116 2.45  1.32 58  2.28 1.32 58 2.62 1.31 
 
Pre-existing loan (0,1) 117 0.82  0.39 58  0.79 0.41 59 0.85 0.36 
 
Loan amortization period 
(years) 116 21.16  4.45 58  20.16 4.79 58 22.17 3.87 
 
Principal farm manager 
(years) 109 7.98  7.57 50  6.84 6.80 59 8.95 8.10 
 
Off farm income (% total 
income 116 0.30  0.20 58  0.32 0.21 58 0.28 0.18 
 
Farm sales ($) 114 69,647  74,071 56  65,452 68,101 58 73,698 79,798 
 
Gross farm income ($) 114 93,861  90,098 56  91,238 86,782 58 96,393 93,875 
 
Cash farm income ($) 114 15,410  27,305 56  16,350 22,383 58 14,503 31,511 
 






Table 2.  Probit Regression Results for Probability of Being Credit Rationed (dependent variable: credit 














    0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Owned farm machinery  0.004  
(0.002) 
     0.008*** 
(0.003) 








Post-high school education 0.186* 
(0.102) 
   0.318*** 
(0.122) 
Farming arrangement    -0.784** 
(0.305) 
Net worth      -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Off-farm income   -1.467** 
(0.927) 
Loan amortization period     0.135*** 
(0.035) 
Constant   - 0.894** 
(0.425) 
  -2.645*** 
(0.944) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -72.99 -55.69 
Number of observations 111 106 
Wald Chi-square(11) 8.36 34.86*** 
Percent correctly predicted  62% 
Pseudo R-square statistic 0.05 0.24 
 












Exogenous Model Endogenous Model 



















































































































F-statistic 5.31*** 3.77*** 4.43*** 3.12*** 
N 46 55 46 53 
R-square statistic 0.52 0.49 NA NA 
     
 
a/
 Standard errors in parentheses   
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level  22 
 










rationed Credit rationed 
 
Total farm liabilities 0.020 0.042** 0.022 0.036* 
 (0.078) a/ (0.019) (0.077) (0.019) 
 
Principal farm manager  783 -34.3 774 -72.4 
 (1,153) (483.3) (1,189) (460.6) 
 
Owned farm land  10.6 -56.6* 14.8 -59.4* 
 (58.9) (32.5) (66.8) (31.9) 
 
Higher education 1,158 16,199** 2,639 10,527 
 (6,215) (7,093) (8,015) (6,674) 
 
Living expenses  470 313* 496 274 
 (424) (188) (461) (212) 
 
Farming arrangement (0,1) 5,663 -12,264** 5,392 -10,626* 
 (11,848) (5,431) (12,560) (5,839) 
 
Off-farm income   2,217 -38,888** -1,331 -32,348* 
 (36,705) (16,597) (38,441) (17,308) 
 
Mill’s ratio   -5,073 13,912 
   (16,370) (9,111) 
 
Constant -2,804 13,353 -647 27,066*** 
  (16,408) (8,757) (18,274) (9,443) 
 
F-statistic 1.98* 3.68*** 1.23 3.74*** 
N 30 46 30 45 
R-square statistic 0.23 0.45 NA NA 
     
 
a/ Standard errors in parentheses    
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